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In his seminal book The Production of Space (1974), French philosopher Henri 
Lefebvre held that inasmuch as the modern city is a product of economic systems, 
political power, and social forces, urban spaces and architectural sites resemble 
“writing-tablets” where prevailing ideologies, past events, and social relations 
accumulate along with traces left by the bodies of those who use them. Through its 
architectural formations and spatial practice, “each society offers up its own peculiar 
space, as it were, as an ‘object’ for analysis and overall theoretical explication.”1 In 
thinking about the experience of urban modernity, the triadic distinctions between 
conceived, perceived, and lived space that Lefebvre set out lend insight not only into 
architecture’s symbolic role as a mode of projecting national development and social 
progress, but also into the often unpredictable and at times diametrically opposed 
ways in which optimistic promises associated with cutting-edge designs end up 
playing out in reality.2  
 
Throughout the twentieth-century, urban design provided a metric to gauge 
modernity. As governments or private stakeholders sought to set in place the telos of 
developmentalism, grand designs of skyward constructions, futuristic aesthetics, and 
top-down planning stood as ciphers of progress that enshrined technology, 
industrialization, and capitalism. However, despite the unrelenting progress projected 
by forward-looking constructions, the afterlives of grand designs have proved much 
more discontinuous. The global histories of modern architecture, from Le Corbusier’s 
Ville Radieuse (1930) to Lúcio Costa’s Brasília (1956) have demonstrated that 
“blueprint utopia” and reinforced concrete alone are not enough to set modernity in 
place. This is especially evident in developing nations, where urban landscapes are 
shaped by rapid urbanization, population growth, and spasmodic economic activity.3 
In such contexts the modern mechanisms formulated to systematize and regulate 
space by determining “what type of storage, circulation, marking, and classification of 
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human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given 
end” are dramatically undercut by what Michel Foucault terms heterotopia: 
unpredictable “other spaces” where mutually opposed functions and distinct realities 
converge on a single site.4  
 
The repurposing of cutting-edge buildings as makeshift settlements is a compelling 
example of this unpredictability, epitomizing the way that optimistic visions can give 
way to the precarious experiences of social exclusion and urban decline. Over recent 
years, so-called “slumscrapers” and urban squats across the Global South have 
captured the public imagination, revealing the fissured bonds between architecture 
and development, and casting aspersions on governmental capacity for ensuring the 
welfare of vulnerable citizens.5 In Venezuela, the transient occupations of El 
Helicoide (1955) and La Torre de David (1989) epitomize the unpredictable 
relationship of architecture and modernity. Built in downtown Caracas, the two 
projects were originally designed as prospective symbols of Venezuela’s economic 
and urban development: the first a modernist spiral of reinforced concrete that was to 
be a shopping center and industrial exhibit; the second a banking complex of glass 
curtain skyscrapers, designed as a luxurious home to speculative finance and private 
enterprise. After political and economic turmoil left both grand designs unfinished 
and abandoned, both were temporarily turned into provisional housing, El Helicoide 
as a state-led refuge for destitute families from 1979-1982, and La Torre de David as 
a vertical barrio to which the government turned a blind eye from 2007-2014.  
 
In both cases, the repurposing of failed architecture as improvised housing 
demonstrated the disparities between “conceived” ideals of space and “lived” 
experiences of them. Far from isolated problems, the temporary occupations of El 
Helicoide and La Torre de David undercut a fundamental paradigm of Venezuelan 
nationhood, one that holds monumental architecture as extant modernity, and 
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makeshift homes and land seizures (ranchos and invasiones) as its reversal. The 
collapse of the boundaries between aspirational capitalism and urban poverty, 
between planning and contingency, turned the buildings into heterotopic places, 
where blueprint modernity took on the makeshift forms it was supposed to eschew.6 
Retracing the media coverage of the occupations, government-led evacuations, and 
proposals for each building’s reinvention shows how modern architecture remains a 
potent symbol of progress even as makeshift modernity takes shape around it.  
 
El Helicoide’s “Great Occupation”  
Trailer Park  
After democracy was re-established in 1958 after the end of a ten-year military 
dictatorship, Venezuela came to be viewed as an exception in the region: a 
“privileged Third World nation” whose oil wealth and solid political culture 
contrasted to other Latin American countries mired in dictatorships and 
economic strife. The “Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis,” as historians dub this 
national image, retained traction through enviable mineral wealth, stable oil prices 
and social mobility, and by virtue of the country’s feted art and architecture, inherited 
from the “spectacular modernity” of the mid-twentieth century boom period.7 The 
sporadic squatting that took place in the modernist icon of El Helicoide during the 
sixties and early seventies was a direct contradiction of this positive nation brand, 
since it blurred spatial distinctions between forward-looking architecture and 
“backwards” settlements. Under occupation, the building became the antithesis of the 
modernity and prosperity that were emblems of Venezuela’s “exceptional” status, 
creating a malaise summed up by one commentator at the time, who complained that 
El Helicoide had been “turned into a slum overnight, just another of the many hills in 
Caracas tattooed by ranchos where poor people vegetate.” 8  
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This dilemma only got worse when the state turned the would-be mall into a trailer 
park refuge in 1979. After hundreds were left destitute amid a bout of the periodic 
rainstorms that lay waste to ranchos, the government of Luis Herrera Campíns (1979-
1984) ordained a Gran Ocupación (Great Occupation) of El Helicoide, parking 150 
merchandise containers along its ramps as temporary shelters, raising sheetrock 
shacks (barracas) under the cantilevered roofs originally designed for boutique-like 
stores, and placing the building under army “surveillance and organization.”9 Over the 
next three years, thousands more moved in, creating a population of over nine 
thousand residents, the majority of whom lived in the barracas. While most of them 
were genuine damnificados (the term literally means “the damaged” and is used for 
those who have lost homes), “official” residents claimed that just under half were 
invasores—a derogatory label that stigmatized others as “invaders” who had occupied 
El Helicoide illegally.10  
 
No matter their status, the press tarred all residents and their makeshift homes with 
the same brush, depicting them as modernity’s festering underbelly. In one graphic 
opinion piece from 1982, El Helicoide was portrayed as “a mixture of giant rats, 
stinking sewage, muck, shit, tons of trash, scrap, hundreds of destitute families, and 
corruption at all levels.”11 Another, more humanitarian, journalist described the 
building as a community “with no work and no future,” where children cried all night 
and parents labored to scoop floodwater out with tin cans.12 Further emphasizing the 
association with solid buildings and social improvement, the writer asked: “Who can 
progress in a home that collapses with the first downpour…?”  
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Figure 1. El Helicoide during the Gran Ocupación. Video stills from raw footage 
recorded by the rescue committee in charge of relocating residents in 1982. Archivo 
Audiovisual/Biblioteca Nacional de Venezuela. 
 
Video footage of El Helicoide bore out its challenging living conditions. The 
building’s inside was a hotchpotch of sheetrock and zinc roof shacks wedged between 
columns, flooded concrete wastelands, unplumbed wood frames and zinc-sheet toilet 
blocks, and jerry-rigged stairwells (Fig. 1). Outside, haulage containers were packed 
in tight, at least two rows per level, and residents hung their clothes to dry along the 
ramps. Garbage disposal units, an on-site clinic, as well as stores improvised in 
shacks and trailers, selling everything from empanadas and ice creams to “fine shoes 
for men,” showed glimpses of organization in a refuge that although temporary, was 
now ever more permanent. In a nation that prided itself on its high-rise towers and 
“exceptional” political and economic stability, El Helicoide’s Great Occupation 
reinforced the longstanding consensus that makeshift constructions were far from the 
path to progress. More worryingly still, the occupation brought inside the modernist 
structure the very ad hoc constructions and impoverished communities adrift in the 
urban landscape, thus becoming a powerful sign of modernity gone awry. 
 
Curing the Tumor 
As the occupation dragged on, it threatened to incriminate political leaders for leaving 
already destitute communities in even more precarious conditions. Only an alternate 
narrative for El Helicoide and its inhabitants would ratify the state as guarantor of 
social welfare, and reinstate an ideal of urban modernity. Consequently, when the 
occupation was pushing three years, the Federal District governor, Rodolfo José 
Cárdenas, assembled a Comité de Rescate (Rescue Committee) to this end in 
February 1982. The committee, divided into culture, infrastructure, and social 
branches, was tasked with evicting miscreants, clearing shacks, and rehousing 
residents by the end of September. The video footage of the process and the detailed 
report that describes it, entitled Proyecto Helicoide and published in October 1982, 
both underscore the desire to create for posterity an optimistic account of the 
evacuation, through which El Helicoide and its inhabitants were saved from their 
fates.13  
 
Healthcare had long been a concern for the team overseeing the occupation, with 
medical care and vaccination programs administered on site. However, at the time of 
the eviction it was the building’s malaise that needed diagnosis and treatment. The 
section of the report that details the evacuation weaves a narrative of redemption, 
which begins with a description of El Helicoide as the antithesis of the logic of 
hygiene upon which modern urbanization had long been predicated.14 The authors 
depicted a “helicoidal tumor” of cracked cement ramps that was a breeding ground for 
disease, overflowing with a constant stream of sewage and filled with rubble, trash, 
and waste. The lack of hygiene was equated to a moral deficit, through descriptions of 
“infrahuman” conditions in this den of drugs, prostitution, alcoholism, and crime—a 
“sancta sanctorum of transgression” that the police dared not enter.15 Worse still, the 
report’s authors extrapolated the “helicoidal tumor” as symptomatic of the broader 
problem of proliferating barrios in the capital, which called for an “almost therapeutic 
drainage, ” a prescription that would clear makeshift homes and incentivize 
inhabitants “to return to the natural habitat they should never have left.” The 
prognosis was that only by removing the “tumor” of provisionality from the social 
and urban landscape would the ideal of Venezuelan exceptionalism be restored to 
health. 
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If provisionality was El Helicoide’s affliction, then the evacuation of its residents in 
mid-1982 was to be its cure. This process was led by an on site team, with logistical 
support from the Metropolitan Police, also on site, the governor’s office, and the 
Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (INAVI, National Housing Institute). At the 
relocation office, residents could view photos of new housing projects and check lists 
and costs of available apartments, all located outside Caracas. With the logistics of 
evacuation taking shape, the physical purge began. To “achieve the total cleanliness 
of that sickening cement hill,” the “deformed contingent,” as the report dubbed its 
inhabitants, were paid to remove every trace of their homes and to paint and clean up 
the building. In so doing, they were as good as expunging the polluting miasma of 
their occupation of El Helicoide from public sight, in accordance with the principles 
of hygiene undergirding what Ivan Illich has termed the “utopia of the odorless 
city.”16  
 
Figure 2. El Helicoide during the Gran Ocupación. Video stills from raw footage 
recorded by the rescue committee in charge of relocating residents in 1982. Archivo 
Audiovisual/Biblioteca Nacional de Venezuela. 
 
Figure 3.  El Helicoide during the Gran Ocupación. Video stills from raw footage 
recorded by the rescue committee in charge of relocating residents in 1982. Archivo 
Audiovisual/Biblioteca Nacional de Venezuela. 
 
As containers (considered the “deluxe” housing, as the ironic sign “Res. Sheraton” on 
one of them indicates) were freed up with their residents’ transfer to new homes, the 
team set about moving people from the more precarious barracas into these more 
comfortable metal shells (Fig. 2). Video footage shows residents demolishing shacks 
in a question of minutes, thrashing at wooden frames, ripping out sheetrock walls, and 
unfastening zinc sheet roofs, while others sweep away debris, paint the concrete 
ramps, and load their belongings onto trucks (Fig. 3). Whereas El Helicoide’s 
efficient design and round-the-clock construction were once held up as its most 
memorable features, now the report claimed it was the “rotating mechanism” of the 
building’s “uninterrupted evacuation … whose functional efficiency deserves to be 
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remembered.” The repeat cycle vacated the building on a gradual basis: the team 
earmarked shacks to be vacated, moved their occupants into vacated containers, then 
demolished the makeshift homes. Not only were vacant homes demolished, containers 
were progressively removed and dumped at a depot outside the city to ensure that no 
space was ever left vacant and, thus, no new occupations could occur. 
Simultaneously, the eviction team rolled out strategies to restore physical and moral 
“health” to El Helicoide. The police conducted “systematic searches, surveillance, and 
control of access points” to the building, using—in the report’s euphemistic terms— 
“other peculiar modes of persuasion” to incite prostitutes, drug users, and 
troublemakers to leave.  
 
The video footage commissioned by the rescue committee reinforces the report’s 
positive message of redemptive evacuation crafted through a handful of interviews. 
Perhaps encouraged by the interviewer to praise life in El Helicoide, a woman 
standing on the ramps against a backdrop of shanties, tells the camera: “We can’t 
complain, it’s great here. There are policemen who protect us against all the things 
that happen in other barrios.” Another shot shows lines of children doing exercises in 
formation while a man explains how juvenile police training will “rescue them from 
the twisted path of vice and criminal activity.” Surrounded by a swarm of journalists, 
an unidentified government representative also weighed in, explaining that El 
Helicoide’s residents were headed to “top notch homes.” Not only would they have 
electricity, water, and sewerage services, the transport connections and opportunities 
for investment and industry in this relocation hub outside Caracas ensured ongoing 
development. In the background of this shot, men continue to pull walls down with 
their bare hands as people pack up their belongings. The Great Occupation was 
coming to an end. By September 21, 1982, the makeshift homes had been removed 
from public sight and their residents “thoroughly rescued” and relocated 
countrywide.17 El Helicoide’s “tumor” had been cured.  
 
Infinite Spirals 
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With the evacuation over, the official report and media attention shifted their focus to 
the future, heralding a higher purpose for El Helicoide. In a radical alteration of its 
original purpose, the building would be reinvented as a Complejo Cultural Museo 
Nacional de Historia y Antropología (National Museum of History and 
Anthropology-Cultural Complex), housing a range of activities and schools, from 
theater, dance, and textile conservation, through to film, photography, and new media; 
research institutions; and outreach programs to incorporate local communities. 
Deploying the same motif of redemption to present their ambitious plan, the project 
leaders claimed it would change the face of Caracas, administering an antidote to 
short sighted city planning and the prioritization of luxury services over basic needs. 
Moreover, the committee report’s authors presented El Helicoide’s transformation as 
an ideological shift enacted in the urban fabric. The move from mall to museum 
would counter invasive marketization and the rising hegemony of foreign consumer 
culture, while the conversion of its vehicular ramps into pedestrian walkways would 
foster public space and loosen the hold of automobile culture. 
 
El Helicoide was to restore Venezuela’s exceptional status, serving as a microcosm of 
identity and polity that would “gather all moral, cultural, and spiritual resources, 
activate memory, and liberate creative energies,” while enshrining democracy as the 
true path toward the “highest levels of social, economic, and political justice and 
organization.”18 Lauding this wholesale reinvention in his prologue for the report, 
governor Cárdenas reframed El Helicoide’s helical form as a metaphor for an 
uplifting journey toward progress and belonging. In this building “enveloped in 
modernity,” he wrote, future generations would find cultural orientation that would 
“ascend in infinite spirals [toward] a comprehensive image of Venezuelan reality, 
offering a perfect sense of who we are as a people and making us masters of our true 
national identity.”19 No mean feat, indeed.  
 
A month after the eviction, research and museography teams were designing content, 
while the architecture group was planning the new uses of the building and installing 
the geodesic dome at the building’s summit. Although the project made headway, the 
attempt to rebirth El Helicoide was, like earlier attempts, stunted when a change of 
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government halted the ambitious plans.20 Instead of the civic museum envisaged in 
the report, it was the images of young damnificados training as juvenile police 
officers that ultimately presaged El Helicoide’s immediate future as the intelligence 
police moved into the building in 1985, three years after the eviction. Once again, it 
was retrofitted with makeshift structures, but this time they were prison cells, not 
homes. Today, prisoners live in conditions reminiscent of the Great Occupation thirty 
years earlier, locked away in dark, two by three meter cells amid “a vile smell caused 
by recent problems with sewerage, and a stench that pervades the corridors… 
inhabited by cockroaches, rats, and all sorts.”21 El Helicoide has not so much come 
full circle as stayed put, consolidating its role as a provisional place that turned out to 
be permanent.  
 
La Torre de David as Slumscraper 
Space Invaders  
As the removal vans rolled down El Helicoide’s ramps, one man in the video footage 
called for an end to precarious occupations. “In an oil nation like ours,” he said, 
“things like this simply cannot happen.” Yet over subsequent decades provisionality 
has remained a firm fixture of the urban landscape, keeping poor communities caught 
in a recurrent cycle of precarity and destitution. The ongoing growth of Caracas’ 
population has made for an increase in the makeshift homes raised in ravines and on 
sloping hills. These homes, and other more established barrios with them, recurrently 
fall victim to the increasingly irregular rainy season, whose storms cause mudslides 
that dislodge homes and generate floating populations of damnificados who must be 
rehoused temporarily in emergency shelters, then permanently in new homes.  
 
As the milennium approached and dawned, this plight was aggravated. The same year 
Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, a series of catastrophic mudslides displaced 
some 200,000 people in Caracas’ adjoining state of Vargas, fueling the installation of 
new emergency shelters anywhere possible, from hotels in the capital to provincial 
army barracks. During Chávez’s four consecutive terms as president until his death in 
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2013, continuous housing shortages and unpredictable deluges generated a growing 
population of damnificados housed in ad hoc shelters, awaiting state-built homes. The 
bottlenecked relocation programs and persistent rainstorms made visible impact on 
the urban fabric. In 2010 alone, heavy bout of storms left more than twenty-two 
thousand families homeless in Greater Caracas.22 After heavy rains that began in 
December that year and carried on into the new year, the government turned hotels, a 
contemporary art museum, Caracas’ racetrack, government ministries, tax offices, and 
even the presidential palace into refuges. Artworks were put into storage at the Museo 
Alejandro Otero so that 350 people could set up home there; hundreds of families 
were moved into 43 hotels in downtown Caracas; and 650 people were moved into 
grandstands at La Rinconada racetrack, which lacked even basic facilities, such as 
toilets and showers.23 
 
Perhaps inspired by El Helicoide’s earlier occupation, one large-scale solution was to 
house some three thousand damnificados at the Sambil La Candelaria, a huge 
downtown mall that Chávez had expropriated in 2010, just before it was set to open. 
Two years later, although 256 families had been rehoused, dozens were still living in 
the mall, awaiting relocation. Much as had occurred with El Helicoide, the residents 
complained that some of the people who had moved into the mall were not real 
damnificados but invasores—invaders that had taken advantage of the situation to 
take shelter in the refuge and get assigned new government-built homes.24 In reality, 
damnificados were in the minority in the area around the Sambil, since this downtown 
part of Caracas had become a hub for citizen seizures and occupations of empty 
buildings, with twenty or more buildings in the area turned into squats. The most 
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prominent among them was La Torre de David: the abandoned banking business, 
commercial, and hotel complex located between the Andrés Bello and Urdaneta 
avenues. Often branded invasiones (invasions) or tomas (takeovers), citizen 
seizures became a common strategy under Chávez’s government, interpreted as a 
symptom of a longstanding housing deficit that in the new millennium reached 
400,000 homes in Caracas and three million nationwide.25 The Chávez government’s 
advocacy of expropriation and tolerance of seizures created a propitious setting for 
squatters to take over empty buildings. Abandoned towers which, like La Torre de 
David, were left stranded in the financial meltdown of the mid-nineties, became easy 
targets, and from 2003 to 2006 squatters took over 145 buildings in Caracas, 
commandeering more than thirty in January 2006 alone.26  
 
As Chávez shifted from reformist to socialist rhetoric, these two types of makeshift 
occupation—emergency shelters and illegal seizures—became increasingly entangled 
with other fissures cutting through the political landscape.27 Amid the national strikes, 
coup attempts, and protests that rocked Venezuela from 2002 onwards, opponents 
cited the government’s sluggish rehousing of damnificados and lenience on illegal 
squats as proof of incapacity to uphold the rule of law, secure social welfare, or 
preserve the image of a modern, oil-rich nation. It was this antagonistic setting that 
made the seizure of La Torre de David a particularly contentious topic.  
 
Figure 4. The occupation of La Torre de David. Guillermo Suárez, 2014. 
Figure 5. The occupation of La Torre de David. Guillermo Suárez, 2014. 
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 In October 2007, two thousand people forced their way into the site, hanging 
hammocks, pitching tents, and cordoning off spaces with bed sheets. As months 
passed and the government turned a blind eye, the occupation gained ground. People 
built homes around the empty elevator shafts and unguarded stairwells, knocking 
through walls and replacing the glass curtain with tinder-block bricks (Figs. 4–5). 
“We admit that we invaded this place, but after two and a half years we can’t call 
ourselves invaders (invasores) but a community,” one resident told a journalist in 
2010, before going on to explain that after turfing out thieves and drug users, five 
hundred residents had registered the squat as Cooperativa Cacique Venezuela: a 
cooperative that would “promote the construction and urban planning of dignified 
homes, apartments, a community meeting room, preschool, nursery, parking areas and 
a multi-functional room.”28  
 
For all the talk of floor monitors and penalties for sloppy trash disposal, the living 
conditions were undeniably precarious in this shell of a building with no running 
water or proper sewerage for the 4500 people who were living there by 2014. 
Moreover, despite the progressive idea of the cooperative, the squat was subject to the 
vertical hierarchy of Alexander “el niño” Daza, an ex-criminal turned evangelical 
pastor, who was the community’s leader.29 Perhaps unsurprisingly, media outlets the 
world over seized on the story and La Torre de David became the subject of wild 
speculation either as a den of iniquity or home to an empowered commons of citizens 
taking their futures into their own hands. As the squat’s oscillating symbolism 
reached fever pitch, it gained a role on the world stage, now as a laboratory of radical 
housing solutions which was awarded the Leon d’Oro at the Biennale di Venezia in 
2012, now as the star of an episode of Homeland in 2013, where it was depicted as an 
apocalyptic hovel inhabited by Chávez supporters and drug lords.30  
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 Dignifying the Damnificados  
Preoccupied with political turmoil and rehousing damnificados living in similarly 
precarious conditions, the government simply ignored the world-famous squat.31 
Seven years after the original seizure, in 2014 Chávez’s successor Nicolás Maduro 
announced the evacuation of La Torre de David. Operación Zamora, as the plan was 
called, would bring the squat in line with the emotional and moral cornerstones of 
chavismo, which revolutionary narrative honed over previous years, which 
anthropologist Paula Vásquez argues were laid in 1999, during a bout of devastating 
mudslides referred to as the Tragedia de Vargas, or Vargas Tragedy.32 In mid-
December, torrential rains caused mudslides that swept through the coastal area of 
Vargas, Miranda, and Falcón states, laying waste to homes and buildings, and killing 
at least a thousand people. Chávez coined the concept of redemption through state 
humanitarianism during this natural disaster, referred in popular memory in almost 
biblical terms to as “the day the mountain advanced toward the sea.” Emphasizing the 
role of state institutions and military forces in saving those at risk, Chávez used a 
characteristic play-on-words to assert that damnificados should be referred to as 
dignificados: “the damaged” should become “the dignified.”33 
 
This same idea framed the state media campaign devised to narrate the evacuation of 
La Torre de David, whose launch was broadcast live on national television on on July 
22, 2014.34 Venezuela’s television channels chained their signals to a live press 
conference in which Ernesto Villegas, a journalist-turned government minister, 
publicly launched Operation Zamora, alongside representatives from state institutions, 
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security forces, and civil protection agencies.35 Explaining that “the building lacks 
even the minimum conditions to live safely and with dignity,” Villegas clarified that 
the operation was a peaceful, unarmed, evacuation (desocupación sin armamento) 
devised to ensure occupants’ welfare, not a coercive eviction (desalojo). The motif of 
humanitarianism played out through the split screen coverage, which combined live 
reportage with pre-edited footage as government representatives described the 
evacuation in one part of the frame, and the other section switched between vertigo-
inducing tilts of unguarded stairwells and the twenty-seventh floor roof terrace to 
smiling children waving from windows and soldiers helping residents carry boxes 
(Fig. 6). Just as the footage of El Helicoide’s evacuation had charted this process righ 
through to shots of the removal vans winding their way down the ramps and on to 
new homes, the coverage of the press conference La Torre de David dwelt on the 
residents’ relocation, showing buses filling up to take people to their new homes in 
Ciudad Zamora—a “socialist city” outside Caracas that the president had described as 
a symbol of “the emergence of a new Venezuela” (Fig. 7).36  
 
Figure 6. Screen shots of Operation Zamora press conference, Venezolana de 
Televisión, July 22, 2014. 
 
Figure 7. Screen shots of press conference at Ciudad Zamora, Venezolana de 
Televisión, February 7, 2014. 
 
Amid the evacuation, the question of La Torre de David’s future hung in the air and 
the building retained its symbolic status. While Ciudad Zamora marked a new start, 
the occupied skyscraper was vilified as “monument to the failure of neoliberalism,” a 
ruin worthy only of demolition.37 This classification resonated with versions of 
Venezuela’s modern history that explained chavismo as a movement that would clear 
away the wreckage of previous administrations, eradicating corruption and social 
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exclusion to make Venezuela anew. On television after the evacuation, Villegas lent 
weight to this idea, claiming that the dangerous conditions and lack of dignity in the 
squat were the fault of neoliberalismo, not chavismo.38 Presenting the building as the 
embodiment of a political and economic ideology that was being uprooted, state 
media broadcast pictures of Villegas knocking down makeshift walls with a sledge 
hammer, then welding shut the doors of vacated apartments inside the tower.39 The 
suggestion was that the building’s demolition put a final nail in the coffin of the old 
political order. 
 
The evacuation moved apace and by Christmas 2014 twelve floors of makeshift walls 
had been demolished and only a third of the squatters were left.40 The demolition 
thesis turned out to be more subterfuge than serious plan. The fact remained that La 
Torre de David was just one example of occupied buildings in the capital left over 
from periods of previous economic crisis. If this ruin were demolished, then how 
many others would also have to meet the cannon ball? By May 2015 newspapers 
carried a positive story: the allocation of resources to fund a grand scale 
reurbanization plan in the area around La Torre de David, which encompassed the 
nearby Sambil mall, which was still partially occupied by damnificados from 2010.41 
With this plan, even if total evacuation was not possible in other makeshift shelters 
and squats in the vicinity, then at least the area would benefit from 5000 m2 of new 
public space as residents awaited relocation to new homes.  
 
As for La Torre de David itself, in mid-2015 Maduro visited the site to announce its 
transformation into “a grand center for culture, sport, art, and security,” a project 
whose magnitude inevitably evoked the string of abortive plans proposed to reinvent 
El Helicoide as a beacon of culture after its curtailment. The two buildings are cast in 
                                                 
38
 Ernesto Villegas was referring the Gran Misión Vivienda (Great Housing Mission) 
on Zurda Konducta, an opinion program on state channel Venezolana de Televisión, 
August 20, 2014. 
39
 “Vea como fue clausurado el piso 28 de la Torre Confinanzas,” Contrataque 
Guerrilla, YouTube, July 25, 2014; “En marcha sexta fase de la Operación Zamora: 
49 familias se mudan,” Comisionado Presidencial para la Transformación 
Revolucionaria de la Gran Caracas, 11 August 2014. 
40
 “Villegas asegura que 66% de la Torre Confinanzas ha sido desalojada,” El 
Universal, 24 December 2014.  
41
 “Aprueban recursos para mejoras en el entorno de la Torre Confinanzas,” El 
Universal, May 22, 2015. 
the same mold, with El Helicoide’s troubled reinvention a direct antecedent of the 
debates that arose regarding the future of La Torre de David. As well as education and 
training facilities for all ages and a “grand communications, coordination, and 
response center,” Maduro speculated that the failed skyscraper could become a hub 
for manifold cultural institutions, from the youth orchestra to “cutting-edge film 
studies that will make Hollywood squeal.”42 A year later, with the complex 
effectively under the control of the security forces, this grand plan had gained scarce 
ground. Instead, the La Torre de David’s empty shell had found a more fitting, even 
poetic, function. During a nationwide earthquake simulation staged in mid-2016, the 
main tower played the part of a collapsed building where search and rescue drills 
could take place in a realistic milieu.43 As firemen barked instructions to groups of 
people crouching amid the bare walls, and police dogs searched for fictitious victims 
amid the rubble left over from the squatters’ homes, La Torre de David’s makeshift 
structure finally made some sense, if only for a day.  
 
Eternal Provisionality 
Despite the decades that separated them, retracing El Helicoide and La Torre de 
David’s respective descents into provisionality unearths cracks that run much deeper 
than the specific controversies caused by their initial curtailments. Through their 
transient occupations, these buildings tell much more complex stories than their 
original grand designs envisaged. As architectural designs that were figureheads of 
the formal economy and capitalist expansion, El Helicoide and La Torre de David 
projected an image of urban modernity that buttressed Venezuela’s “exceptional” 
status as a prosperous, albeit developing, nation. The grand scale of the architectural 
fantasies devised to incarnate this imaginary in the urban landscape was conceived to 
overshadow precisely the marginal communities and precarious dwellings that might 
undercut the vision of progress. However, when the two buildings were turned into 
makeshift housing, they were opened up to precisely the vulnerable groups and 
precarious materials that were excluded from the formal systems of spatial and 
economic regulation. Part monumental contour, part improvised shelter, El Helicoide 
and La Torre de David became symbols of makeshift modernity: a composite 
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phenomenon of failed architecture and enduring social exclusion, whose 
discontinuous narratives lurch between arrested futures and knee-jerk policies in 
which grand designs retain traction as a marker of progress. 
 
Politicians’ compulsion to stage dramatic redemptions of these buildings’ inhabitants, 
and to reinvent the structures on a scale as ambitious as their original designs, 
highlights the extent of the malaise that occupied buildings have presented in 
Venezuela’s recent history, as well as the central role that spatial imaginaries continue 
to play in political agendas that promise better futures. Thrust back into the public 
imagination, these grand designs-turned-makeshift refuges threatened to undermine 
the promise of ever-greater development that continues to undergird political projects 
for the nation, no matter their ideological framing. Amid portrayals of El Helicoide 
and La Torre de David as the antithesis of urban modernity, eviction and reinvention 
provided a way for the incumbent governments to turn the story of these squats 
around. Demolishing the makeshift structures inside them, rehousing residents outside 
the city, and mooting ambitious reinvent plans for the two urban icons, can be 
understood as attempts to restore the idea of state-led redemption and rehabilitate a 
spatial imaginary in which grand designs would once again prevail over provisional 
sites.  
  
The pattern that emerges from El Helicoide and La Torre de David’s occupations 
reaffirms Michel Foucault’s assertion that even as architectural designs promise “to 
ensure a certain allocation of people in space, a canalization of their circulation, as 
well as the coding of their reciprocal relations,” designs and intention do not govern 
social or spatial relations. Rather, it is “the perpetual gaps between intentions in 
relation to one another,” and the disparities between the design and use of El 
Helicoide and La Torre de David, that offer glimpses of the challenges and 
inequalities that are part of the experience of modernity.44 Those cracks shed light on 
the makeshift modernity that has shaped Caracas and other cities, where the 
convergence of aspirational designs and social deficits is patently visible and demands 
spatial arrangements that not only fulfill the desire to project and realize development, 
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but that also respond to the needs of the communities that remain excluded from 
formal economic and urban circuits.  
 
The repeated, and failed, attempts to refurbish El Helicoide with new and grandiose 
functions should thus serve as a warning in discussions about the future of La Torre 
de David and other spaces that have been caught adrift in moments of upheaval. As 
one inhabitant of El Helicoide put it four decades back: “We want something stable 
and permanent. In this country the provisional is eternal.”45 As a metanarrative for 
national development and social welfare, the ideal of urban modernity and progress 
through architecture is clearly far from a depleted resource. Yet, rather than grand 
designs of what the future should look like, the patterns of provisionality that emerge 
in El Helicoide and La Torre de David’s occupations and evacuations signal 
additional demands. Their status as icons of makeshift modernity reveals a need for 
architectural structures and social policies that will marshal collective optimism and 
safeguard citizen welfare even as the climate keeps changing and the economic tides 
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